Archives – Combat proven : Lessons Learned From The French Air Force Support Combat Command (I of II)

Supporting the Rafale © armée de l’Air et de l’Espace
(as published at https://operationnels.com/2014/05/11/le-csfa-combat-proven/)

An Interview with Air Force Lieutenant General Jean-Marc Laurent, former Commander of the French Air Force Support Command*.

*This interview, conducted in May 2014, was published in Opérationnels SLDS.

(By Murielle Delaporte) - In the interview below, conducted in 2014, General Laurent reviews the evolution of the CSFA (“Commandement du soutien des forces aériennes”, i.e. French Air Force Support Command), when he was commanding it as well as the South-West Defense and Security Zone. This command, born in 2008 from the French Air Force AIR2010 program, was then preparing to merge with the CFA (French Air Force command). This reform highlighted the CSFA’s primary function of supporting forces "at the heart of operational maneuvers", as well as its proven technical-operational performance, deployment after deployment. Serval, an emblematic French operation which occurred in Mali in 2013, is the focus of a dedicated section in this article (Part II) and illustrates that fact, despite the difficult conditions of a theater characterized by "the amplitude of its field of operations" and "the acceleration of operational time", to which the CSFA was able to constantly adapt.

How did the support for the French military air assets evolve since you became head of the CFSA, and what are the prospects for the future?

The air force support environment has changed a great deal since 2010.

In this respect, the term "transformation" is more appropriate for a reality that is not simply an "evolution". Each army has its own dynamic support elements, which are intimately linked to the operational tempo of its engagements, and which are particularly marked by the environment in which they operate.

The aim of this form of support is to meet immediate, local operational needs, which are not always covered by medium- or long-term planning, and which are often even marked by the stamp of randomness. This is why, in order to correctly express the purpose of this support, I often refer to it as "support", since its aim is to accompany operational maneuvers, and often even anticipate them, and to generate technical-operational solutions to facilitate them, rather than simply responding to a technical production need.

So, as far as the CSFA is concerned, we are more concerned with "supporting forces" than "supporting forces". This distinction should not be seen as a semantic subtlety. It clearly reflects the fact that the men and women of the CSFA are as much combatants as they are technicians, and that they are not part of the forces' environment, but an integral part of it. In fact, one out of every two airmen and airwomen - and sometimes more at the start or end of a mission in crisis zones - reports to this command, which is not just a technical branch of the air force, but represents its technical-operational component.

To be clear and precise, the CSFA does not produce technology for technology's sake. We do not produce support services. We produce operational capability, which is intended to have a military effect. So we're right at the heart of the Force.

What's more, the ambiguity surrounding the name of this command will soon be removed, as it will be merged with another Air Force command, the CFA (Commandement des forces aériennes), which manages the Air Force's "operators", be they linked to weapons systems, C2 systems (command and control) or protection systems. The CSFA will thus be merged into the Air Force's "Air Forces" counting for half the workforce.

The CSFA has adapted to the transformation and modernization of defense equipment, which have strongly impacted the military MRO players.

• The first noticeable trend has been joint pooling on information systems, human resources as well as infrastructure. These major changes in support governance, coupled with changes in force formats (2008 White Paper) have led to a halving of the CSFA staff and the transfer of many support functions to joint support structures.
• In addition, a sustained drive to industrialize aeronautical maintenance operations has led to a very significant outsourcing of MRO (Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul) to industry especially regarding second-level technical operations.

Today MRO support coming from the French industrial sector – both public and private – accounts to about 75 to 80 % with armed forces units’ support approaching a low point which cannot be exceeded without affecting operational capability. In the end, through transformation, rationalization and industrialization, the CSFA has seen its workforce reach its current target of around 12,000 people, more than 90% of them military, and the operational context has led it to refocus on two major families of operational missions that are at the heart of Air force operations: support for weapon systems and support for air maneuvers. These support missions are carried out on airbases, designed to be the combat tool of the Air force, as well as in deployments in overseas operations within air force detachments.

The first of these missions is technical-operational support for weapon systems. This is mainly what we call in French “MCO” for “maintien en condition opérationnelle” – literally “maintaining in operational condition” -, which covers a somewhat larger spectrum than MRO. In the acronym “MCO”, the last letter, which expresses its operational character, is fundamental: MCO does, of course, cover maintenance, but is not limited to this activity. For example, preparing an aircraft for an airborne operation (configuring the weapons system, fitting the armament, deploying sensors, preparing electronic warfare devices, etc.) is not maintenance. It belongs to mission preparedness and combat action. These operations call for specific expertise that "combat technicians" must be able to develop in all situations, and in particular those involving a very sustained tempo, those marked by a degraded logistical context, and those facing an unstable security environment.

To provide technical-operational support for weapon systems, the CSFA relies primarily on various squadrons, e.g. “aeronautical engineering squadrons” (ESTA), “aeronautical logistics squadrons” (ESRT) and “aeronautical environment equipment implementation squadrons” (ESME).

The second operational CSFA mission is air maneuver support. It is highly complementary to weapons systems support, for which it often provides the functional framework (aeronautical installations and information systems). But it also acts for other elements of the armed forces, sometimes enabling them to carry out complex and sensitive missions (special operations command, land and sea forces).

Air maneuver support mainly involves two areas:

• The first is aeronautical information and communication systems. This is a specific sector of SIC which includes command and control systems (C2), air and space radars, tactical air links, equipment for aeronautical platforms, etc. It is also, and this is the subject of the next chapter, the area of aeronautical information and communication systems. It is also - and this is clearly a central issue today - a support for cyber-defense (the AFSC leads the Air Force's technical center in this area). To support the tactical maneuvering of aeronautical CIS, we have dedicated squadrons on air bases (ESICAéro - Escadrons des SIC aéronautiques). The AFSC has also set up an airborne CIS battle group, based at Evreux, which is a form of "CIS regiment" in that it is an immediately deployable, highly mobile unit, present in all theaters of operation and at the heart of crisis zones (FOB in Afghanistan, with special forces, in the Navy's ATL2s during Harmattan, in the Sahel of course, etc.). Aside from tactical systems implementation, the AFSC's rare and sought-after expertise lies above all in its ability to design C2 architectures for air operations.
• The second area of maneuver support is "air operations engineering". This involves the ability to set up the conditions to accommodate weapon systems, their operators and their operational technicians. In France, it is responsible for the unique expertise in aeronautical installations at air bases (deterrent installations, aeronautical areas, control towers, hangars, command centers, etc.), which the defense agency in charge of infrastructure then translates into infrastructure projects in conjunction with construction companies. In operations, the role of the airborne engineering forces is to develop and build parking and operating facilities for air force detachments. This includes demining and securing terrain, as in Afghanistan. It also involves building or restoring aeronautical runways, as in Tessalit in Mali, and developing aeronautical facilities that enable our joint air force to operate, as in Niamey, Bamako and Gao, but also, during the 2011 Harmattan operation in Lybia, in Souda and Sigonella, as well as in Central Asia, in Djibouti, in Chad, and so on.

In order to correctly express the purpose of this kind of sustainment, I refer to it as "support", because its aim is to accompany the operational maneuver, and often to anticipate it, and to generate technical-operational solutions to facilitate it, rather than to meet a single technical production need.

Within the French Air Force, the CSFA is to continue this process of operational maturation, through a functional and organic rapprochement with the CFA. This will make the technical-operational chain of command even more robust. Above all, it will put the Air force in the best possible position to face up to new defense challenges, to innovate in terms of concepts and doctrines of employment through greater synergy between Air force combatants, optimize force readiness at a time when human and material resources need to be managed with particular care, increase coherence between operators and technicians to provide decision-makers with the best capability solutions, and manage risks even more effectively (human factor, air safety, resource management, etc.). ).