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Photo: maintenance of the Mirage 2000, a fighter Ukrainian pilots are currently being trained in France to fly on the battlefield © Julien Fechter, French Air Force ( as published in >>> https://archives.defense.gouv.fr

Military Aviation MRO and the concept of « war economy » (I of II)

By Murielle Delaporte

While the conflict in Ukraine has restored a vocabulary not used since World War I, the choice of words and the scope of their meaning must be interpreted in the context of the 21st century and in the light of the transformations that have marked recent decades.


This is particularly true of the concept of “war economy” reintroduced by French President Emmanuel Macron at the inauguration of the Eurosatory trade show in 2022. If the desired effect is mobilization, then the choice of word was a wise one, as countless articles and speeches have since then emerged on a subject which, until a few months ago, was rather unbeknown to the general public. But if the aim is to transform the defense economy so that it is well positioned to face up to a major conflict, then the declaratory policy of the Commandant in Chief of the French Armed Forces may have triggered some confusion among some observers, which the current budget law only partially dissipates.

This two-part article is an attempt to clarify a little bit two key questions:

  • What does this concept actually consist of?
  • What impact does it have on the aeronautical MRO sector?

More a surge capacity than a war economy per se?

Beyond the expression, most decision-makers and observers agree that the reality corresponds more to the dual desire, first, to regain control – either literally through direct ownership/repurchase or indirectly - over the national production apparatus and, secondly, to recapitalize an industrial capacity in order to enable French - but also Allied - armed forces to cope with large-scale operations (LSOs).

In this respect, the concept appears first and foremost as an incentive to reboot a production model before enhancing concrete military capability.


As military engineer and defense consultant Marc Chassilian described in an article published in January 2023, “from an industrial point of view, if today we are at level 1 of the scale, level 2 would be an industrial base capable of satisfying the needs deployed in the 1960's-70's, level 3 would be the rearmament plan of 1936, and level 4 a real war economy, that of 1915-1918” (1).


Last February, General Alexandre Lahousse, then head of the Industrial Affairs and Economic Intelligence Department of the French Defence Procurement Agency (« Direction Générale de l'Armement ») and now in charge of the recently creacted Defence Industry Directorate, outlined the five key building blocs necessary to “produce more and faster”, the way Minister of the Armed Forces, Sébastien Lecornu, aspires to (2):

  • visibility for manufacturers;
  • simplification of procurement process;
  • securing supply chains;
  • recruitment;
  • funding (3).

A number of measures are currently being drawn up and/or implemented, building on a number of reforms and restructurings which occured over the years, particularly in the MRO-Aerospace sector.

Footnotes

(1) The “war economy”, a long-term project, January 21, 2023 (https://www.zonebourse.com)

(2) This new Defense Industry Directorate has in particular been tasked with “strengthening the capabilities of the armed forces to manage industries and enhance the security of the defense industrial and technological base (DITB).” (https://www.lalettre.fr).

(3) See: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/economie-guerre-5-chantiers-produire-plus-plus-vite